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This article explores the shifting definition(s) of Panhellenism in fourth century Athenian 
political discourse, and argues that the flexibility of the concept can help to explain how the 
Athenians are able to continue to utilise this idea in their political arguments, even in the 
rapidly changing interstate environment of the late Classical and early Hellenistic period. Close 
analysis of the deployment of Panhellenic arguments before and after Chaeronea, and in the 
final decade of the century, throws further light on the ways in which Athens’ use of this 
ideology both responds to and shapes their position in Greek interstate society. 
 





In an important and still influential article, published in 1976, Shalom Perlman explored the 
relationship between two of the most visible themes in the interstate politics of Classical 
Greece: the quest for empire, and the rhetoric of Panhellenism. ‘Panhellenism’, he concluded, 
‘was a tool of political propaganda, serving first and foremost the hegemonial and imperialistic 
aims of the Greek polis’.1 Panhellenism was an ideology (or a claim to an ideology), Perlman 
argued, which was deployed to secure the supremacy of one Greek polis over others, not to 
achieve political unity, still less equality, among the Greeks; this is a pattern of behaviour 
which can be traced throughout the Classical period, from Athenian imperial propaganda 
during the Delian League, via Sparta’s incursions into Asia Minor in the early fourth century, 
to the coming of Philip II and Alexander III of Macedon. 
 
In the discussion which follows, I take as my starting point the assumption that Perlman was 
essentially correct to see a significant and recurring connection between imperial ambition and 
                                                          
* This article began life as a contribution to a Cambridge colloquium on Panhellenism: I am grateful to 
Michael Scott for the invitation to tackle the subject, and to him and other participants in the conference 
for their responses to my initial thoughts. I am indebted also to colleagues in Manchester and to the 
reviewers and editors of Historia for their helpful suggestions. 
1 Perlman 1976: 30. 
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Panhellenic rhetoric. My aim in this article is to explore in more detail the way in which this 
connection operates in Athenian political discourse, especially in the latter part of the fourth 
century BC. In doing so, I hope to draw attention to two important developments in the 
rhetoric of Panhellenism, and in its relationship with political power. In the first part of this 
article, I explore the way in which the definition of Panhellenism is stretched not only to 
include enemies other than Persia but also (and more significantly) to exclude the necessity of 
collective Greek action.  That is: not only need Panhellenism not have unity as its outcome – as 
Perlman already noted – but it might not necessarily even involve unity as one of its methods. 
This progressive redefinition of the concept, I argue, allows Athens to continue to assert a 
position of Panhellenic leadership long beyond the point when their diminishing political 
power should, logically, have made such claims impossible. The second part of the article 
focuses more closely on the relationship between these Panhellenic claims and Athens’ position 
both as aspirational imperialist and as a subordinate member of another (Macedonian) empire. 
Here, I aim to outline both the changes and – perhaps more notable – the continuities in 
Athenian conceptions (or assertions) of the connection between Panhellenism and power. My 
suggestion is that tracing in detail the use of Panhellenism in this period can help us both to 
chart and to comprehend the Athenian response to their changed position in the Greek world, 
as well as more fully to understand the persistence of Panhellenic language in Athens beyond 
the end of the Classical period. 
 
2. Defining and Redefining Panhellenism 
2.1 Homonoia, freedom and the war against Persia 
In most modern definitions, political Panhellenism is taken to be ‘the belief that the various 
Greek cities could solve their endemic political, social, and economic problems by uniting in 
common cause and conquering all or part of the Persian Empire.’2 There is, in other words, a 
necessary, and mutually reinforcing, connection between the unity of the Greek poleis and a 
collective, aggressive campaign against an external enemy.  
 
This idea is most famously associated with Isocrates (although he is far from unique in 
proposing it),3 and most easily exemplified by his writings. In the Philip, for example (a text 
                                                          
2 Flower 2000a: 97-8; more generally on the history and problems of defining ‘Panhellenism’: Mitchell 
2007: xv-xxi 
3 On the precursors to ‘Isocratean’ Panhellenism, see Flower 2000b (who traces the origins of this theme 
back to the immediate aftermath of the Persian Wars); see also Mitchell 2007: ch. 5.  
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seen by some as the culmination of Isocrates’ Panhellenic thought),4 Isocrates sums up the way 
in which he thinks a Panhellenic campaign should function: 
One must do nothing until one finds the Greeks doing one of two things: 
either undertaking the expedition or offering full support to those who are 
undertaking it ... Therefore those who plan wisely must not wage war 
against the Persian King until someone has effected reconciliation among 
the Greeks and put a stop to the madness which now afflicts them (Isoc. 
Philip 86-8). 
The concept of homonoia – fellow-feeling, or unity of purpose – recurs in Isocrates’ descriptions 
of this style of Panhellenism. Greek unity and Greek success against Persia are inseparable, and 
mutually reinforcing, elements: Persia cannot be defeated until the Greeks are united, and a 
campaign against Persia will provide the best mechanism for creating that unity5  
 
Although the extent to which Isocrates’ ideas directly influenced any fourth-century politician 
can be questioned,6 it is clear that similar views did have an impact on both the conduct and the 
rhetoric of interstate politics throughout the classical period. According to Thucydides (I.96.1), 
the early propaganda of the Delian League cultivated the twin ideas of a unified Greek alliance 
and a war of revenge against Persia.7 A similar theme appears in Xenophon’s portrayal of 
Agesilaus’ campaigns of the 390s: the Spartan king, according to Xenophon’s surely over-
optimistic assessment, won widespread support among the Greeks for his policy of taking the 
war over to Persian territory and seeking revenge on Persia for the wrongs done in the 
previous century (Ages. 1.8).8 The campaigns of Alexander the Great can be seen as the 
                                                          
4 For this view, see especially Dobesch 1969, Payrau 1971. More generally on Isocrates and Panhellenism, 
see Mathieu 1925: chs. 5 & 6; Hamilton 1980: 95-8; Flower 2000b: 93-6; Bouchet 2014: 132-54. 
5 The connection between homonoia and war against Persia appears throughout Isocrates’ writings: see, for 
example, Panegyricus 3; Antidosis 77; Philip 16, 40, 141; Panathenaicus 42, 77, 217; that Isocrates himself saw 
this as a defining feature of his policy is implied by his summary of his career at Panath. 13 (‘I have led the 
way in speeches which urge the Greeks to homonoia among themselves and war against the barbarians’). 
There is some development in Isocrates’ view of the causal relationship between homonoia and victory 
over Persia: earlier speeches are less insistent than the Philip on homonoia as a precondition for success, 
and place more emphasis on it being an outcome of victory over Persia (see Perlman 1969; on homonoia in 
Isocrates see also Dillery 1995: 54-8; Bouchet 2014: 171-8). 
6 Sakellariou 1980: 134; for fuller discussion of Isocrates’ political agenda, Too 1995. 
7 The question of the sincerity or longevity of the anti-Persian rhetoric of the Delian League is too large to 
explore here, but for a good analysis of Thucydides’ presentation of the League’s original objectives, see 
Rawlings 1977. 
8 The Panhellenic aspect of Agesilaus’ campaign is more strongly visible in the Agesilaus, but identifiable 
in the Hellenica too (e.g. in Agesilaus’ decision to emulate Agamemnon’s pre-campaign sacrifices at Aulis: 
Hell. III.iv.3): see Cawkwell (1976) 66-71, Cartledge (1987) 180; more generally on Xenophon’s 
representation of Panhellenism, Dillery (1995) ch. 3. For a more pessimistic assessment of Agesilaus’ 
success in unifying the Greeks, see Isocrates Philip 88 (below, pp. 000-000). 
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culmination of this policy: like the Athenians and Spartans before him Alexander found in the 
language of aggressive Panhellenism both a justification for a war (ostensibly a war of revenge) 
against Persia, and a means by which to insist on the necessity of collective Greek support for 
his war.9  
 
The ideal of unity, harnessed in the service of a war of vengeance against Persia, is one 
distinctive feature of Panhellenic language in the fifth and earlier fourth centuries. A second, 
perhaps even more prominent, theme is the promise of freedom. The claim that the fight 
against Persia was also a fight for freedom (or against slavery) can be traced back at least to the 
immediate aftermath of the Persian Wars,10 and the two concepts remain closely linked for the 
rest of the Classical period (and beyond).11 Isocrates projects this view of Panhellenic, anti-
Persian action back into the past (so that, for him, the Battle of Plataea was one fought by the 
Greeks, and particularly the Athenians, in order to secure Greek freedom (12.93)); and he also 
makes it a part of his forward-looking Panhellenic propaganda (Philip, for example, is 
encouraged to undertake a campaign against Persia ‘in the cause of freedom’ (ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ: 
5.139)). As with the ideal of homonoia, the objective (or claimed objective) of freeing the Greeks 
from Persian enslavement is not restricted to Isocratean rhetoric: it seems very likely that it 
formed part of Athens’ justification for the creation of the Delian League;12 it surfaces again in 
Xenophon’s description of Agesilaus’ activities in Asia Minor in the 390s;13 and it is still visible, 
albeit less dominantly so, in accounts of Alexander’s campaigns.14 However, although the 
                                                          
9 The motif of revenge is particularly visible in the stories of Alexander’s burning of Persepolis (Arrian An. 
III.18.12, D.S. XVII.72.2-3, Plut. Al. 38.2-4), though it was employed before that too (e.g. by Philip in the 
immediate aftermath of Chaeronea, according to D.S. XVI.89.1-2). For Alexander’s desire to emphasise the 
Panhellenic element of his campaign (at least in its early stages), note, e.g., the conspicuously harsh 
punishments given to those Greeks captured fighting on the Persian side: Arrian An. I.16.5. Generally on 
Alexander’s use of Panhellenism, see Flower 2000a. 
10 See, for example, the language of the Simonidean epigrams on the Persian Wars: the Athenians at 
Marathon saved Greece from ‘the day of slavery’ (δούλιον ε͂̓μαρ: IG I3 503/4, A.I, line 2 = FGE XXa, line 4); 
the Greeks who fought in 480 and 479 are praised for ‘rescuing the cities from hateful slavery’ 
(δουλοσύνας στυγερᾶς ῥυσάμενοι πόλιας: D.S. XI.33.2 = FGE XVIIb, line 4); see further Mitchell 2007: 
10-11, and, on the wider context of the association of Greek identity with freedom (and Persian with 
slavery) in this period, Raaflaub 2004: 59-89. 
11 On freedom propaganda (especially as applied to the Asia Minor Greeks) in the Classical Period see 
Seager & Tuplin 1980; in the Hellenistic period, Seager 1981; on its use in Greek politics in the Roman 
period, Dmitriev 2011. 
12 Note in particular the complaints of the Mytileneans at Thuc. III.10.3: ‘we did not become allies of the 
Athenians for their enslavement of the Greeeks, but we became allies of the Greeks for their liberation 
from the Persians (ἐπ’ ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου)’; see further, Raaflaub 2004: 87-8. 
13 For example at Xen. Ages. 1.33, in the context of Agesilaus’ attack on (/liberation of) Sardis; cf. also Ages. 
1.35. 
14 Diodorus (at XVII.24.1) makes Alexander claim that he was fighting for the cause of Greek freedom; 
compare also Theopompus, FGH 115, F253, for the argument that those who died fighting with Alexander 
did so ‘for the sake of your kingship and the freedom of the Greeks’ (ὑπὲρ τῆς σῆς βασιλείας καὶ τῆς τῶν 
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connection between Panhellenism and freedom is pervasive, the way in which this connection 
is presented is strikingly fluid; in particular, the identity of the enemies of freedom, as we will 
see, is notably open to variation.  Indeed, the shifting application of the ideal of liberation is, in 
many ways, the key to understanding the great flexibility, and therefore vitality, of Panhellenic 
ideology in the fifth and fourth centuries. 
 
2.2 Panhellenism without Persia 
What, then, does this flexibility look like in practice? The version of Panhellenism outlined in 
the previous section – one directed against Persia, portraying Persia as the enemy of Greek 
freedom, and conceptualised as involving aggressive, united action against its target – is 
undoubtedly important in the rhetoric of interstate politics throughout the Classical period. But 
other versions of Panhellenism were available – or at least, capable of being appealed to.  
 
The first variant form of Panhellenism is distinguished, above all, by its focus on defence rather 
than attack: the freedom and well-being of Greece still needs to be secured, but from a tangible 
threat rather than the more nebulous menaces envisaged in the Isocratean model of 
Panhellenism. A further important difference which follows from this basic point, and which is 
crucial in explaining the longevity of this type of Panhellenism, is that there is much more 
scope for variation in the identity of the threat. It might still be Persia, as it is, for example, for 
Demosthenes in his speech On the Symmories.15 But the danger can equally well be represented 
as coming from some other external source – most obviously and most pervasively in 
Demosthenes’ assembly speeches, Macedon. In On the Chersonese for example, Demosthenes 
argues that the Athenians must aim: 
to shake off this overwhelming and unbearable idleness, to contribute money 
and call upon our allies, to see to and provide for the permanent upkeep of our 
army so that, just as Philip has a force ready to attack and enslave all the 
Greeks, so may you have one ready to save and help all (8.46). 
 
The shift of enemy from Persia to Macedon is not, perhaps, all that radical: for some, at least 
(notably Demosthenes) both were equally barbarian, external threats to the well-being of the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
῾Ελλήνων ἐλευθερίας). On the (surprising?) lack of emphasis on the theme of freedom in accounts of 
Alexander’s campaigns, see Seager 1981: 106-7; Flower 200a: 118-19. 
15 See esp. Dem. 14.3, 31-40. 
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Greeks.16 But the threat to Greek freedom could also be conceived of as coming from within the 
Greek world. This type of argument was (according to Thucydides) already deployed – albeit 
not always very effectively – by the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War. At II.8.4, Thucydides 
claims that Spartans were perceived as the liberators of Greece (from Athenian oppression), a 
perception picked up on by the Mytileneans’ in their appeal for Spartan support for their 
rebellion from Athens in 428/7 (III.10.3, 13.7), and played on to great, if also conspicuously 
coercive, effect by Brasidas in his campaigns in northern Greece: ‘if you are going to oppose 
both your own freedom and that of the rest of Greece’ (Brasidas warns the city of Acanthus, in 
his attempt to persuade them willingly to accept ‘liberation’ by his army), ‘that would have 
dire consequences...’ (IV.85.4).17 
 
Conversely, in the fourth century, a version of the same rhetoric is deployed by Athens against 
the new (alleged) enemies of Greek freedom: Sparta. The ‘prospectus’ of the Second Athenian 
League (RO 22, IG II2 43) claims as one of the League’s purposes the desire that ‘the Spartans 
allow the Greeks (τὸς Ἕλληνας) to be free and autonomous, and to live at peace’ (lines 9-11),18 
while an Athenian decree relating to Mytilene (RO 31, IG II2 107; passed in 369) gives an 
indication of what that commitment might look like in practice: 
Reply to the envoys who have come that the Athenians fought for the freedom 
of the Greeks ([ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερία]ς τῶν Ἑλλήνων); and that when the 
Spartans were campaigning against the Greeks, contrary to the oaths and the 
agreement, they themselves went to help, and they called on the other allies to 
                                                          
16 Third Philippic 30-46 is a good example of Demosthenes both emphasising Philip’s non-Greek status, and 
equating the (fifth-century) war against Persian barbarians with this new struggle against Macedonian 
barbarians. Compare Theopompus, FGH 115, F27: his claim that ‘Europe never bore such a man as Philip’ 
is (at best) double-edged: Flower 1994: 98-104. On Demosthenes and Panhellenism, see Dunkel 1938, 
Luccioni 1961, Perlman 1976: 23-5; on Demosthenes’ redefinition of Panhellenic enemies, Green 2004 
(who, however, sees this change as a dilution of the Panhellenic ideal, rather than a productive re-
definition). 
17 Brasidas’ skill in deploying the language of Greek freedom and Greek unity is (surely deliberately) 
portrayed as being in contrast to the ineptitude of other Spartan commanders, notably Alcidas (esp. at 
III.32.3). For a reading of Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War as one which deliberately plays 
on and subverts Panhellenic ideas, see Price 2001. The idea is undoubtedly important to Thucydides’ 
conception of the war, but it is not a purely Thucydidean creation: note especially Xenophon’s narrative of 
the final action of the war – the destruction of Athens’ walls to the sound of flute-girls, since ‘that day was 
the beginning of freedom for Greece’ (Xen. Hell. II.ii.23). 
18 Note that this representation of the Spartans as enemies of Greek freedom originally sat alongside a 
clause expressing friendship for the traditional holder of that role: the Persian King (on the content of the 
erased reference to the King’s Peace at lines 12-14, see RO ad loc (and cf. Cargill 1981: 28-32)). Concerns 
about over-idealisation of the Second Athenian League have led some scholars to downplay the 
Panhellenic element of this decree (Cargill (1981) 12-13), but assertions of Panhellenism are surely not 
inconsistent with self-interested exploitation. 
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offer the help due to the Athenians, keeping to their oaths, against those who 
were breaking the treaty (lines 40-9).19 
By the last quarter of the century, the enemies of Greek freedom have shifted again. According 
to Hyperides, in his funeral oration for the dead of the Lamian War, they now include Boeotia 
and Euboea (6.11); those cities had been fighting alongside Macedon and therefore (in 
Hyperides’ eyes) fighting against the freedom of the Greeks.20 In fact, the identity of the enemy 
can even become completely irrelevant, as long as the basic cause – securing the freedom of 
Greece – remains consistent. So Demosthenes, in the On the Crown, can conflate all Athens’ wars 
(fought against Greek and non-Greek enemies) into one unified Panhellenic crusade: 
I pass over ten thousand examples I could mention: sea battles and land 
expeditions, campaigns from long ago and from our own times; in all of 
these our city engaged herself for the freedom and salvation of the rest of 
Greece (18.100). 
The details of who was being fought are, here, immaterial to Demosthenes’ argument; the 
important point is that, while the appearance of the threat might have changed, the threat itself 
– the risk of losing Greek freedom – has not, and neither has Athens’ (or Demosthenes’) 
consistent and implacable hostility to that threat.21 
 
2.3 Panhellenism without homonoia 
If the identity of the enemy can become notably fluid in this version of Panhellenism, so too can 
that of the members of the Panhellenic alliance, and with it the focus on unanimity – homonoia – 
which is such a strong feature of the Isocratean version of Panhellenic thought.22 Panhellenic 
leadership (or a claim to have exercised such leadership) does not, that is, necessarily entail the 
existence of Panhellenic followers, a situation which – while formally entirely illogical – seems 
to have been rhetorically plausible, and which is also crucial to understanding the persistence 
of this language throughout the Classical period. 
 
While it is of course true that even Isocratean Panhellenism placed considerable emphasis on 
the role and status of a single, leading Greek state (and left considerable scope for the leader to 
                                                          
19 On the context and purpose of this decree, see Tonini 1989. 
20 Hyperides’ re-shaping in this speech of language usually associated with the Persian War, and his 
application of it to the events and ideals of the Lamian War, is noted by Hermann 2009: 23-4. 
21 A similar conflation of past (anti-Persian) and present (anti-Macedonian) Panhellenism seems to have 
been used in Hyperides’ Against Diondas, p.1 line 32- p.2 line 2: in opposing Philip II, the Athenians were 
aiming to ‘set the Greeks free by the risks that you ran as in the past’ (tr. Carey et al 2008). On the 
relationship between this speech and Demosthenes On the Crown, see Todd 2009. 
22 Above, n. 5. 
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use its position to demonstrate and enhance their own power and prestige),23 Isocrates did at 
least count the support of other Greek states as a necessary foundation for such leadership. 
Agesilaus’ expedition to Asia Minor, for example, was (according to Isocrates) necessarily 
bound to fail because the Spartan king’s attempt to combine self-interested power-building 
with his Panhellenic project alienated the support which was vital to the project’s success: 
Agesilaus had two objectives and, although both were laudable, they were 
mutually incompatible and could not be carried out at the same time. For he 
had elected both to campaign against the Persian king, and to restore his 
friends to their cities and put them in charge of affairs. So the result of his 
actions on behalf of his friends was that the Greeks were caught up in trouble 
and danger and, because of the unrest which arose at home, did not have the 
time or the ability to fight against the barbarians (Philip 88; compare To 
Archidamus 11-14). 
 
Other accounts (and especially other later fourth-century accounts) of Panhellenism, however, 
are notably less insistent on the importance of unanimity. The claim that total isolation is 
undesirable does not, to be sure, completely disappear from view: Demosthenes’ version of the 
size and make-up of the anti-Macedonian army assembled at Chaeronea (18.234-8), for 
example, makes it clear that the Athenians’ ability to persuade other Greeks to fight alongside 
them was still a matter of pride (and, conversely, that an allegation of alienating potential allies 
was still potentially damaging). Nevertheless, even here Demosthenes can claim that the fact 
that Athens provided a disproportionately large number of troops should be seen as a source of 
satisfaction not shame, using the experience of the Persian Wars as his paradigm:  
Don’t you know that of that famous fleet of triremes which fought for the 
Greeks in earlier times, which numbered three hundred ships in total, our city 
provided two hundred … and she gave thanks to the gods that, when a shared 
danger surrounded all the Greeks, she herself had contributed twice as much 
as all the rest for the salvation of everyone (18.238). 
Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates (delivered in the same year as the Crown) shows that it was possible 
to go even further in downplaying non-Athenian contributions. Athens, he claims, was ‘being 
deserted (ἐγκαταλειπόμενοι) by all the Greeks’ before the Battle of Salamis (1.70); her role at 
Marathon was to act as prostates – single champion – for the whole Greek world (1.104).24 
                                                          
23 Perlman 1976: 25-9 
24 This airbrushing of other Greeks from the Athenian narrative of the Persian Wars is not new: for an 
early and egregious example see the Athenians’ speech at Sparta before the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 
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Lycurgus’ argument here is that, even though other Greeks were physically present at these 
Panhellenic encounters, they lacked Athens’ total commitment to the Panhellenic cause. The 
Athenians, he claims, had to compel (ἀναγκάσαντες) the other Greeks to stay and fight with 
them at Salamis (1.70). Not only, therefore, can Athens’ victory there be represented as a 
triumph belonging to the Athenians alone, it can also be presented as a victory achieved 
(paradoxically) over Athens’ own, Greek, allies: ‘our ancestors ... triumphed unaided (μόνοι) 
over both enemy and allies, in a way suitable to each, conferring a favour (εὐεργετοῦντες) 
upon one and defeating the other in battle’ (1.70).  
 
Panhellenic unity, insofar as it exists at all in these examples, is therefore more a product of 
coercion than of any real unanimity of purpose, and both the specific language and the general 
sentiment of homonoia is almost entirely absent.25 Demosthenes emphasises the constant risk 
that those Greeks who had been persuaded to fight Philip might suddenly defect to the enemy 
(18.239); only Athens has the embedded sense of responsibility to the Greeks which would 
make it unthinkable for her to abandon the cause:  
If it was necessary for someone to put a stop to these things, who else should 
have acted if not the Athenian demos? That was my policy and, when I saw 
Philip enslaving all of mankind, I opposed him, and I never ceased from 
advising you and urging you not to yield (18.72).26  
Perhaps the most striking example of this fundamentally unilateralist approach to Panhellenic 
unity comes in Hyperides’ Funeral Oration for the dead of the Lamian (or Hellenic) War.27 For 
Hyperides, Athens is: 
like the sun, which visits the whole world, and separates the seasons as is 
proper, arranging everything for the best, and, where men are sober and 
prudent, provides for men’s birth and disposing all things for the best, 
with provision, where men are virtuous and prudent, for their birth and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
I.73-4) – although the other Greeks are at least allowed a shared in the Battle of Salamis here). For other 
fourth-century examples, see Walters 1980, Marincola 2007 (the latter noting, at 112-14, that it seems very 
likely that other Greek poleis were engaged in similar efforts to make their own contribution to the war the 
single most important). 
25 Demosthenes typically uses homonoia in the sense of unity within the polis (as, e.g., at 22.77); the 
reference to homonoia at 9.38 is the one place in the Demosthenic corpus where unity between, as well as 
within, Greek states seems to be implied. The word does not appear in Lycurgus Leocr. or in Hyperides 
Epitaphios, and is unattested in classical Athenian inscriptions (although it does appear in Hellenistic 
documents: see Thériault 1996, chs. 2 & 3). 
26 The argument that Athens is the only polis which can be relied on to perform this task recurs in this 
speech (see, e.g. 18.20, 99-101, 200-8), and in Demosthenes’ assembly speeches (e.g. 1.25, 9.74). 
27 On the name of this war, see Ashton 1984. 
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nurture, for crops and all the other necessities of life; in just the same way 
our city continues to punish the wicked, to help the just, to allot to all men 
fairness in place of injustice, and at her own risk and expense to assure for 
the Greeks a common safety. (6.5) 
The analogy here is one based on the unstinting provision of good things to the deserving: 
Athens showers benefits on the Greeks, and neither gets nor expects anything in particular in 
return.28 But although one could characterise this as something approaching altruism, it is also 
possible to see something less benign in this arrangement: the sun – Athens – pours out these 
benefits whether or not anyone wants them, and in a manner and direction over which none of 
its beneficiaries have any control.  
 
The sense which emerges from these literary sources, therefore, is that Athens’ interest in 
Panhellenism is fundamentally Athenocentric; and this is further reinforced by the epigraphic 
record. Claims that the Athenians saw themselves as the defenders (and/or saviours) of the 
Greek world are not absent from inscriptions of this period: most notably (as we saw above), 
the ‘prospectus’ of the Second Athenian League makes a programmatic assertion that Athenian 
policy will be shaped around a commitment to defend the Greeks, while the Athenian response 
to the Mytilenean complaint of 369/8 (RO 31), indicates that this position retained at least some 
rhetorical force (even if the fact that the Mytileneans had cause to complain suggests that 
Athens’ practical commitment to it was open to question). The Athenians are then (albeit to a 
very limited extent, to judge from the extant evidence) prepared in epigraphic contexts to claim 
that they have been acting in the best interests of the Greeks. What they are much less willing 
to do (again, to judge from the extant evidence) is to allow that non-Athenians might also have 
been inspired by such Panhellenic sentiments. Evidence for non-Athenians being credited with 
actions which have benefitted other Greeks is almost non-existent in the Athenian epigraphic 
record, amounting to (at best) three examples in the Classical period (from a corpus of c. 270 
Athenian decrees honouring non-Athenians).29 A decree of 394 (RO 11) honouring the Cypriot 
King Evagoras seems (although the text is very poorly preserved) to have praised him for 
acting as a Greek, on behalf of Greeks.30 (Evagoras’ position on the margins of the Greek world 
might have made it particularly important to emphasise both his ethnicity and his motivations 
                                                          
28 On denial of reciprocity as a theme of Athenian interstate rhetoric, see Herman 1998, Missiou 1998. 
29 A figure calculated on the basis of material collected in Lambert 2006, 2007, Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 
covering the period from 451 (the date of the earliest extant example: IG I3 17) to 322. 
30 Line 17: [__________ ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλ]άδος Ἕλλην [.....]; it is possible that a reference to Evagoras’ 
relations with Greeks should also be restored in lines 11f, although the text here is even more fragmentary 
([_________ Ἕλλ[η̣νες Εὐ|[αγόρα... ).  
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in this context.) Two further possible examples, again in honorific decrees, appear in the second 
half of the fourth century, although in both cases the references to Greeks are restored.31 
Otherwise, though, the epigraphic record of the Classical period indicates a notable reluctance 
on the part of the Athenians to acknowledge non-Athenian benefactions to the Greeks. 
 
This pattern persists into the early Hellenistic period. In 318/17, the Athenians posthumously 
re-affirmed the honours they had awarded to Euphron of Sicyon  
… since Euphron, son of Adeas of Sicyon, has previously on every 
occasion continued to show himself a good man towards the people of 
Athens, both himself and his ancestors; and during the Greek war which 
the people of Athens began on behalf of the Greeks (ἐπὶ τοῦ πολέμο]υ τοῦ 
Ἑλληνικοῦ, ὃν ἐ[ν]ε̣[στήσατο ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων ὑ]πὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων]) 
....; and when it happened that Greece suffered misfortune and garrisons 
were sent into the cities which had expelled them, he preferred death at the 
hand of his enemies, fighting for the democracy, rather than to see his own 
native city or the rest of Greece enslaved (IG II2 448, 40-5, 52-6). 
The Greeks have, it is true, been helped by Euphron’s action – but only indirectly. Euphron 
helped the Greeks not so much on his own initiative, or in his own right, as by providing his 
support to those who were really in charge of affairs – namely, the Athenians. In this decree (as 
in some of the literary examples discussed above), Athens reserves for herself the monopoly on 
Panhellenic benefaction.  
 
Indeed, even this very limited expression of Panhellenic sentiment is epigraphically atypical. 
The original decree passed for Euphron (in 323/2; IG III3 1, 378) has absolutely nothing to say 
about the Greeks (even though, presumably, it would have been equally possible to frame the 
Athenians’ actions in those terms at the start of the Lamian War as it was at the end). Instead, it 
is the Athenians and their allies who are the focus of interest here; Euphron is praised for ‘his 
excellence and his goodwill toward the People of Athens and the other allies’ (13-15). And the 
terms of the first Euphron decree are far more representative of the bulk of Athenian decrees 
passed between the Battle of Chaeronea and the last decade of the fourth century: the vast 
majority of the Athenian decrees published throughout this period seem to have absolutely no 
                                                          
31 IG III3 1, 519 praises the honorand for assistance to Athenians ‘(and all?) Greeks’ (line 14) sailing 
through the Hellespont (for the restoration, see Woodward 1956: 1-3, Lambert 2007, no.63). IG III3 1, 517 
has a more certain reference to the Greeks (line 7), although Lambert 2007, no.109, is justifiably sceptical 
about the restoration (proposed for lines 6-7 in the previous edition of this inscription, IG II2 270) of a 
reference here to actions performed ‘on behalf of the freedom of the Greeks’. 
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interest in attributing a Panhellenic dimension to the actions which they record or discuss. The 
omission is particularly notable in IG II3 1, 316 (RO 77), a decree honouring Acarnanian exiles, 
almost certainly for their participation in the Battle of Chaeronea. As we have seen, Athenian 
literary sources are insistent that this was a battle fought on behalf of all the Greeks; this is a 
line of argument which is visible also in the Athenians’ epigraphic commemoration of the 
(Athenian) dead of that battle (IG II2 5226).32 But the Acarnanians are praised only for their 
friendship to the Athenian demos (line 9): 
Since Phormio and Carphinas are hereditary friends of the Athenian 
people, and preserve the good will towards the Athenian people which 
their forefathers handed on to them… (9-11). 
Athens may have been trying to save Greece at Chaeronea, in other words, but non-Athenians 
(or so this decree makes it seem) were interested only in helping Athens. Athens remains the 
sole supplier of good things for Greece. 
 
How might this apparent lack of epigraphic Panhellenic engagement be explained? It is not the 
case, after all, that that inscribed texts are any less interested than our literary sources in 
asserting Athens’ relevance to and pre-eminence in other parts of the Greek world. But these 
documents are certainly much more reticent in claiming that the Athenians are the proper 
judges of what counts as being in the best interests of the Greeks (if, that is, we read the act of 
honouring someone because he has ‘done good things’ for a particular community as an 
implied statement that the honouring power also has the capacity to judge what is good for 
that community). This apparent reluctance to claim this position of authority over the well-
being of the Greeks initially seems rather out of step with the line consistently adopted by 
authors of Athenian literary texts. My suggestion, though, is that this pattern might be another 
consequence of the tendency to unilateralism which I argued for above: acknowledging, 
particularly in the context of an honorific decree, that a non-Athenian has done something to 
help the Greeks might undermine the claim that Athens (and Athenians) alone are responsible 
for securing the well-being of the Greeks. This, combined with the particular characteristics of 
the Athenian epigraphic habit in this period (above all, the fact that the vast majority of 
                                                          
32 The reference to the dead fighting for the salvation of Greece (line 3: ὡς ἱερὰν σώιζειν πειρώμενοι 
Ἑλλάδα χώραν) is restored on the basis of the version of the epigram in Anth. Pal. VII.245; the sentiment 
is comparable with that of one of the inscribed Persian War epigrams (IG I3 503/4, A.I, line 2: ἔσχον γὰρ 
πεζοί τε [καὶ ⌊ὀκυπόρον ἐπὶ νεο͂⌋]ν / ℎελλά[δα μ]ὲ πᾶσαν δούλι⌊ον ε͂̓μαρ ἰδε͂ν). 
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inscribed honorific decrees relate to the activities of non-Athenians),33 results in an overall 
epigraphic impression of general disinterest in Panhellenic matters. In terms of content, then, 
the emphasis of the epigraphic record is indeed not quite consistent with that of the literary 
sources, but the underlying cause of this phenomenon – the obsession with the pre-eminence of 
Athenian actions – is of course entirely compatible with the views which we have seen 
expressed there.  
 
What becomes particularly visible in Athenian discourse in the years from Chaeronea to the 
Lamian War is, in short, a notably solipsistic version of Panhellenism. A model of Greek unity 
emerges which is exclusively focussed on the status and honour of a single polis, and which 
also allows that city to plausibly claim a position of Panhellenic leadership even if they can 
actually count few (or no) Greek poleis as their allies. The distinctiveness of this position is 
especially striking when it is contrasted with those models of Panhellenism which make 
unanimity an essential part of it. However, it is also very clear that this style of unilateral 
Panhellenism does not emerge from nowhere; rather, it represents an elaboration of ideas 
which had been intrinsically tied up with Panhellenic claims for at least the preceding century: 
ideas, that is, which allowed that the Panhellenic community was always likely to be 
hierarchical, and that Panhellenic leadership might need to be imposed rather than freely 
embraced. The position of solitary Panhellenism which Athens (or some Athenians) reach by 
the 330s and 320s might, then, be illogical in its own terms, but it is reached by a process which 
does not require any radical political or rhetorical moves – and this, in turn, must be crucial in 
understanding why the idea of Panhellenism is able to endure, in the face of such dramatically 
shifting political realities.  
 
3. Panhellenism, imperialism, and resistance to imperialism 
3.1 Before and after Chaeronea 
Claims about Panhellenism in this period, in Athenian discourse at least, are therefore still very 
closely tied up with claims to power and status in the interstate arena. But the more specific 
relationship between Panhellenism and imperialism in the years around Chaeronea needs 
more discussion – particularly because there seems to be a distinct shift in the way in which the 
connection between Panhellenism and empire is represented in this period. It is worth 
emphasising that this change is (as far as the extant evidence reveals) visible only in literary 
                                                          
33 It is worth noting that the vast majority of inscribed honorific decrees from this period are honours for 
non-Athenians: Veligianni-Terzi 1997 lists, for example (for the period 451-322) 178 decrees of the 
Athenian polis honouring non-Athenians, and 20 honouring Athenians. 
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texts: the Athenian epigraphic record’s general disinterest in the collective actions or 
aspirations of the Greeks remains unchanged for a few more years.34 We are dealing, then, with 
a change in political representation rather than (necessarily) in real political action; but that 
change is still worth noting.  
 
Demosthenes’ pre-Chaeronea speeches repeatedly emphasise both the necessity of concerted 
Greek action, and the inevitability of Athenian leadership of that action (see, for example, 6.8-9; 
9.28-9, 73-4; 10.46). On the other hand, Demosthenes is relatively circumspect in making too 
extravagant claims or too explicit connections between his proposed policy of Panhellenic 
action and any potential for Athens’ future imperial revival. The reason for this is not, I would 
argue (for reasons I will address below), that either Demosthenes or his audience have entirely 
given up on such imperial dreams. The problem, rather, is that Philip’s actions – the actions 
Demosthenes has to condemn as absolutely unacceptable – might look rather familiar to those 
accustomed to Athenian modes of behaviour: seeking to adopt a position of leader of the 
Greeks, while at the same time enhancing his own (self-interested) power (see the 
characterisation of Philip’s actions at Dem. 4.10-11, for example). And, just as it is essential for 
Demosthenes to emphasise that Philip’s claimed concern for Greek well-being is only a façade, 
so it is equally important not to give any hint that Athens’ interest in Greek affairs might have a 
similar motivation. This concern is particularly clearly expressed in the speech On the Navy 
Boards: Athens (according to Demosthenes) needs to be wary of moving too quickly or too 
forcefully on behalf of the Greeks, for fear of alienating those very Greeks and driving them 
into the arms of the enemy out of fear of Athens (see, for example, the argument of Dem. 14.4). 
This is an early speech, and the enemy here is Persia rather than Macedon; nothing quite so 
explicit appears in the Macedonian speeches, but it does not seem unlikely that the same 
concern would still apply, and that it could explain why the connection between Panhellenic 
rhetoric and state power appears in unexpectedly muted, or even entirely negative, forms in 
Demosthenes’ pre-Chaeronea speeches. Either claims to defend the Greeks should be viewed 
with suspicion (especially when they are made by Philip); or, when they are treated as genuine, 
they should be seen as ways in which imperialism can be thwarted rather than sustained. This 
latter approach provides the logic which underpins Demosthenes’ striking account of the 
sequence of empires in the Third Philippic (9.23ff): Athenian, Theban, and Spartan attempts at 
empire all failed, and the reason they failed was because the rest of the Greeks got together to 
                                                          
34 Discussed in Section 3.2, below. 
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curb their excesses. Panhellenism, in this speech, is (or should be) a check on imperial ambition, 
not a means for its expression.  
 
After Chaeronea, though, there is small but significant change: the direct link between 
Panhellenic leadership and imperial power is allowed to resurface, and can be presented once 
more as a positive ideal. For Aeschines, the connection is seen as a missed opportunity: if 
things had worked out as they should, Athens would have secured a common peace, united 
the Greeks, and regained hegemonia: 
You could have made that former peace, fellow citizens, supported by the 
joint action of a congress of the Greek states, if certain men had allowed 
you to wait for the return of the embassies which at that crisis you had sent 
out among the Greeks, with the call to join you against Philip; and in the 
course of time the Greeks would of their own accord have accepted your 
hegemony again (3.58). 
Demosthenes, for obvious reasons, is more up-beat about the inherent value of the policy 
adopted. Athens, he insists, did the right – the inevitable – thing in attempting to combine her 
own supremacy with the salvation of the Greeks; the quest for ‘primacy, honour and renown’ 
(πρωτείων καὶ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης) recur in the On the Crown (18.66, 202-3) as the three necessarily 
connected things for which Athens had fought (‘in every generation’ and ‘without pause’: 
18.203). The claim that Athens’ commitment to the Greek world is absolutely and unshakably 
embedded is not new; a very similar assertion appeared in the Second Philippic (6.8-9). But what 
has changed between the two speeches is the reason for Athens’ attitude: in the Second Philippic 
it was portrayed rather more idealistically – love of Greece is motivation enough; now, Athens’ 
concern for her own status is allowed to play a much more central role. 
 
What seems to be happening, then, is that the visibility of the asserted connection between 
Panhellenism and imperialism is in inverse proportion to the likelihood of that connection 
having any real impact. This should perhaps not be too surprising: any worries which might 
have existed in Athens pre-338 about frightening off potential allies are now, surely, much less 
relevant, and Athens is so far from being a real imperial threat to anyone that it is now much 
less important to avoid seeming like one. On the other hand, the tradition of vague, self-
centred, Panhellenic rhetoric is flexible enough to allow these ideas and assertions to persist, 




3.2 Panhellenism without imperialism? 
I have argued so far that the Athenians’ reluctance to allow other states a share in their 
Panhellenic posturing is apparently unchanged – indeed, if anything, amplified – by the 
upheavals of Chaeronea, and similarly undented by the experience of the Lamian War. But in 
the last decade of the fourth century, and more specifically in the period from 307 to 301, it is 
possible to detect a distinct change in Athens’ attitude to (and claimed interest in) the Greeks.  
 
The change is visible above all in the epigraphic record. In a break with past practice, the 
‘motivation’ clause of honorific decrees, which, as has been seen, has until this point has tended 
to focus exclusively on benefits to the Athenian polis or demos, now becomes much more 
inclusive. In 307/6 the people of Tenos are honoured because ‘they have been euergetai to the 
polis of Athens and to the other Greeks’ (IG II2 466, lines 9-10).35 Other decrees of this period 
add a third party, and, in doing so, give away what must lie behind this sudden outpouring of 
Panhellenic enthusiasm: eunoia (or philotimia, or similar virtues) is displayed to the Athenians, 
the Greeks, and to King Demetrius. IG II2 492, for example (a decree of 303/2) records honours 
for a certain Apollonides who ‘does what is beneficial for the kings and the demos of Athens 
and all the other Greeks’.36  
 
It is, therefore, not very hard to spot the motivation for this apparent sudden interest in 
rewarding actions which help all the Greeks. This language is, if not dictated, then certainly 
inspired by Demetrius, is being enthusiastically employed by his Athenian followers, and has 
to be connected with the rhetoric of Panhellenic liberation being employed by Demetrius and 
Antigonus at the end of the fourth century. More specifically, it seems likely that there is a link 
between the appearance of this language in Athenian honorific decrees and the foundation of 
the Hellenic League in 302. If the restorations are to be trusted, this league claimed to be 
                                                          
35 It is unclear exactly what the Tenians had done to provoke the award of this honour. Reger 1992: 365-8 
suggests that they might have provided assistance in liberating Athens from Demetrius of Phaleron; cf. 
Habicht 1997: 69, n.7. 
36 The likelihood that this language is being used either with the aim of pleasing the Antigonids, or even at 
their explicit request, is enhanced by the fact that this decree is proposed by Stratocles, a particularly 
prolific decree-proposer who seems to have been willing to propose decrees according to Demetrius’ 
specific requests (see, e.g., IG II2 486, lines 11-12, with Tracy 1995: 162-3; more generally on Athenian 
flattery for Demetrius, see Athenaeus 6.253a). The same formulation – praise for actions benefitting kings, 
Greeks and Athens – appears in IG II2 555 (307-3), lines 2-4. IG II2 558 (302) praises Oxythemis of Larisa for 
his ‘goodness to the kings and to the demos of Athens’ (lines 7-9), ‘in order to encourage emulation in all 
those who unhesitatingly compete for the favour of the kings and the freedom of the Greeks’ (lines 11-14); 
on Oxythemis and his good deeds, see Bielman 1994: no. 15. Osborne D51, honours for Nicomedes of Cos, 
may include (at lines 5-6) a reference to ‘being a good man (ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς) and displaying his goodwill 
and philotimia to all Greeks’, but the restoration of this extremely fragmentary text is very uncertain. 
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particularly concerned with fostering ‘anything of advantage to the kings and the Greeks’ (StV 
446, lines 83-4). Indeed, one of the presidents of that League – Adeimantos of Lampsacus – is 
honoured by the Athenians for his ‘prothumia and eunoia to the Athenian people and the allies 
(?) and all the Greeks’ (Agora 16.122 (c.302), lines 23-5).37 
 
Even so, the novelty of these decrees – and of their implications – should not be 
underestimated. In diplomatic terms, the Hellenic League is far from innovative: it stands in a 
tradition of Greek multilateral organisations which stretches (ultimately) back to the Delian 
League, and which has a clear recent predecessor in Philip II’s League of Corinth.38 As has been 
seen, such leagues typically made some sort of claim about uniting, protecting or defending the 
Greeks, but were also typically reluctant to allow such claims to be voiced by anyone other 
than the hegemonial (or imperial) power. The language which appears in these Athenian 
decrees suggests that Demetrius and Antigonus were encouraging or allowing a move away 
from the self-obsessed Panhellenism visible earlier in the century, and towards a model which 
is perhaps rather closer (in its presentation, at least) to the more co-operative, homonoia-
dominated, picture of Panhellenic action championed by Isocrates. 
 
3.3 Panhellenism, imperialism, and nostalgia 
The last years of the fourth century do, then, mark an important development in the political 
use of Panhellenic language. But it is worth noting that the old ways of thinking do not 
disappear. If anything, in fact, it seems possible that the Antigonid enthusiasm for this new 
style of Panhellenism encouraged the Athenians to engage a renewed flurry of their own 
preferred way of representing their concern for the Greeks, and of asserting the connection 
between Panhellenism and their own political power. 
 
A small cluster of decrees is passed in this period which retrospectively honour men for their 
assistance during the Lamian War of 323-2. The first of these is dated to 306/5: Timosthenes of 
Carystos is honoured, 
                                                          
37 The reference to allies is restored, and is questioned by Badian & Martin 1985. IG XII.9 198 records 
Eretrian honours for Adeimantus, for his ‘arete and philotimia towards the polis of Eretria’ (lines 10-11); a 
preamble to the decree added thanks to Demetrius for his goodwill and support for the Greeks and the 
demos of Eretria (lines 3-6). The Athenian honours for Nicomedes of Cos (above, n. 36) are preserved as 
part of a dossier which includes similar honours from at least nine other poleis or groups (Herzog 1942: 12-
20, I.Cos 71C). 
38 For the League of Corinth see RO 76; on its adaptation of existing diplomatic traditions, Perlman 1985.  
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because in the previous war which the Athenian demos fought against 
Antipater on behalf of the freedom of the Greeks ([ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλ]ευθερίας τῶν 
[Ἑ]λλή[νων) he was sent by the synedros of Carystos to the camp of the 
Athenians and allies and fought for their safety, speaking and doing what was 
beneficial both for the demos of Athens and for the Carystians (Osborne, 
Naturalization D43, lines 6-12). 
Two more decrees (IG II2 505, 506) were passed in 302/1, also awarding retrospective honours 
for services rendered in the Lamian War, and referring to it as the ‘Hellenic War’ (IG II2 505, 
line 17; IG II2 506, lines 9-10).39 This was not a new claim: Hyperides’ funeral oration is suffused 
with this idea, as has been seen, and (as has also been seen) the specific language of acting ‘on 
behalf of the freedom of the Greeks’ also has a near epigraphic precedent in the posthumous 
honours voted for Euphron of Sicyon in 318/7(although the inclusion of ‘freedom’ in the 
formula is a new development here).40 But the revival, and repetition of this language is in 
many ways as revealing as the innovations visible in other decrees of the period: Athens had 
undergone a series of political upheavals since the Lamian War, and even now – with some sort 
of democracy restored – was in no position to make serious claims about fighting for the 
freedom of others; rather, they were now a polis on which other, greater, powers would claim to 
bestow freedom.41 But while Demetrius’ encouragement of Panhellenic language seems to have 
provided a way for him to foster his own imperial power, and to demonstrate Athens’ less 
dominant role, it seems not to have hampered the Athenians from reactivating their own 
favoured way of conceptualising Panhellenic politics: that is, the model in which they are the 
sun around which all Panhellenic activity revolves. 
 
                                                          
39 There seems to have been a wider revival of interest in (or revival in the acceptability of 
commemorating) the Lamian War in this period, although the Panhellenic element of the war is not 
consistently emphasised: IG II2 493 (honours for Nicon of Abydus, 303/2) also includes retrospective 
praise for services in the Lamian War (here referred to as ‘the former war’: lines 19f). A reference to the 
war has also been seen in IG II2 492 (see p. 000 above for this decree, and Tracey 1995: 28, n. 34 for the 
reading). A similar urge to commemorate newly-respectable events of the 320s must underpin the 
posthumous honours voted to Lycurgus in 307/6 (IG II2 457). 
40 As noted above (n. 31), the restoration of this phrase in the (probably earlier decree) IG II2 270 seems 
unlikely to be correct, and has been omitted from the revised edition of this inscription in IG III3 1, 517. 
41 D.S. XX.45.4 characterises the regime of Demetrius of Poliorcetes as a return of freedom to Athens; that 
the language of liberation was used by Demetrius himself is implied by SEG 36.164, an honorific decree 
for Sotimos of Cyrene which reports a letter from Demetrius to Athens, praising the honorand as ‘a friend 
to him [Demetrius], a supporter of the affairs of the kings and the freedom of the Athenian demos, and a 




The discourse of political Panhellenism is remarkably persistent and pervasive, and, 
particularly in the final third of the fourth century, notably consistent. This in itself should 
perhaps not be terribly surprising: Panhellenism is in many ways a fundamentally nostalgic 
ideology, and Greek diplomacy in general is equally committed to arguments based on 
precedent and tradition. But the persistence of Panhellenic ideology is enabled, at least in part, 
by the flexibility of the ideals and actions which to which the Panhellenic label can be applied. 
It is this flexibility which can help to explain why even the biggest political upheavals of 
fourth-century interstate politics – the Battle of Chaeronea, the Lamian War – do not seem 
radically to affect the ways in which Panhellenic arguments and assertions are deployed in 
Athenian sources.  
 
Does this ubiquity and continuity equate to serious political importance, or is it in fact a 
symptom of irrelevance? I would not want to claim any sort of correlation between the 
pervasiveness of this concept and the sincerity with which claims to be fighting for the Greeks 
were made (or understood), either before or after Chaeronea – not because such claims were 
necessarily always insincere (we are surely not in a position ever to confidently know if they 
were), but because to focus on the ‘truth’ of Panhellenic arguments is to miss the point. Political 
Panhellenism, whether true or not, was useful, and it is this utility which ensured its consistent 
visibility in Athenian political discourse in the Classical period. For the Athenians, even (or 
especially) in the face of dramatically changing circumstances, Panhellenism remained a vital 
diplomatic comfort blanket, to which they could unfailingly cling; which – in the 330s and 320s 
– they could use to swat away any suspicions of imperial insignificance; and with which 
finally, in the last decade of the century, they could shield their eyes from upsetting new 
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